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Abstract This paper proposes a simple voting protocol based on quantum
blockchain. Despite being simple, our voting protocol is anonymous, binding,
non-reusable, verifiable, eligible, fair and self-tallying. Our protocol is also
realizable by the current technology.
Keywords electronic voting · quantum computation · blockchain
1 Introduction
Many voting protocols based on classical cryptography have been developed
and successfully applied since Chaum et al [7]. However, the security of clas-
sical cryptography is based on the unproven complexity of some computing
tasks, such as factoring large numbers. The research in quantum computation
shows that quantum computers are able to factor large numbers in a short
time, which means that classical cryptography is already insecure. To react to
the threat of quantum computers, a number of quantum voting protocols have
been developed in the last decade [9,27,14,10,15,11,26,28,2,24].
To be reliable and useful in practice, voting protocols should satisfy some
desirable properties such as:
1. Anonymity. Only the voter knows how he or she votes.
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2. Binding. Nobody can change a ballot after its submission.
3. Non-reusability. Every voter can vote only once.
4. Verifiability. Every voter can verify whether his or her ballot has been
counted properly.
5. Eligibility. Only eligible voters can vote.
6. Fairness. Nobody can obtain a partial ballot tally before the stage of tally.
7. Self-tallying. Everyone who is interested in the voting result can tally bal-
lots by himself or herself.
To the best of our knowledge, among all the existing quantum voting pro-
tocols, only Wang et al. [28] satisfy all the above requirements. However, their
protocol is difficult to be implemented with the current technology. In this
paper, our aim is to develop a voting protocol which satisfies all the above
properties, in addition to be implementable by the current technology.
An important feature of our protocol is that it utilizes quantum-enhanced
logic-based blockchain developed in [21]. It turns out that blockchain can sig-
nificantly simplify the design of protocols of electronic voting. A quantum bit
commitment protocol is also needed to ensure some desirable properties of
voting. We choose a cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment protocol from
[20] for this purpose because it is efficient and implementable by the current
technology.
We review some background knowledge on quantum blockchain and quan-
tum bit commitment in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we proposed our voting
protocol. We conclude this paper in Section 4.
2 Background
2.1 Quantum blockchain
A blockchain is a distributed, transparent and append-only database which
enables achieving consensus in a large decentralized network of agents who do
not trust each other. It is distributed in the sense that every miner (an agent in
charge of updating the database) has an identical copy of the database. One of
the most prominent applications of blockchain technology is for cryptocurren-
cies, such as Bitcoin [18]. Another important application is the implementation
of self-executable smart contracts [22].
In the quantum blockchain system presented in [21], which we are going to
use for our voting protocol, it is assumed that each pair of nodes (agents) is
connected by an authenticated quantum channel and a not necessary authen-
ticated classical channel. Each pair can establish a sequence of secret keys by
using quantum key distribution [3]. Those keys will later be used for message
authentication.
Updates (new transactions/new messages) of a blockchain are initiated
by those nodes who wish to append some new data to the blockchain. The
classical data of an update is sent via classical channels to all miners, while
the quantum data of the update is sent via quantum channels. Each miner
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checks the consistency of the update with respect to their local copy of the
database and forms an opinion regarding the update’s admissibility. Then all
the miners apply the quantum honest-success Byzantine agreement protocol
introduced in [21] to the update, arriving at a consensus regarding the correct
version of the update and whether the update is admissible. Finally, the update
is added to the copies of the database of every node if at least half of the miners
agree that the update is admissible.
2.2 Quantum bit commitment
Bit commitment, used in a wide range of cryptographic protocols (e.g. zero-
knowledge proof, multiparty secure computation, and oblivious transfer), typ-
ically consists of two phases, namely: commitment and opening. In the com-
mitment phase, Alice the sender chooses a bit a (a = 0 or 1) which she wishes
to commit to the receiver Bob. Then Alice presents Bob some evidence about
the bit. The committed bit cannot be known by Bob prior to the opening
phase. Later, in the opening phase, Alice discloses some information needed
for reconstructing a. Bob then reconstructs a bit a′ using Alice’s evidence and
announcement. A correct bit commitment protocol will ensure that a′ = a.
A bit commitment protocol is concealing if Bob cannot know the bit Alice
committed before the opening phase and it is binding if Alice cannot change
the bit she committed after the commitment phase.
The first quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol was proposed in 1984
by Bennett and Brassard [3]. A QBC protocol is unconditionally secure if any
cheating can be detected with a probability arbitrarily close to 1. Here, Alice’s
cheating means that Alice changes the committed bit after the commitment
phase, while Bob’s cheating means that Bob learns the committed bit before
the opening phase. A number of QBC protocols are designed to achieve uncon-
ditional security, such as those of [4,5]. However, according to the Mayers-Lo-
Chau (MLC) no-go theorem [17,16], unconditionally secure QBC in principle
can never be achieved.
Although unconditional secure QBC is impossible, several QBC protocols
satisfy some other notions of security, such as cheat-sensitive quantum bit
commitment (CSQBC) protocols [8,6,19,13,30] and relativistic QBC protocols
[12,1]. In CSQBC protocols, the probability of detecting cheating is merely
required to be non-zero. With this less stringent security requirement, many
QBC protocols which are not unconditional secure are regarded as secure in
the cheat-sensitive sense and they are also resilient to the attack of quantum
computers.
In Sun and Wang [20] a CSQBC is proposed which is more secure and effi-
cient than all other existing CSQBC protocols. According to Tatar et al [23],
this protocol is also piratically resilient to the entanglement attack, which
damages the unconditional security of many QBC protocols [17,16]. More-
over, this protocol is implementable by the current technology. Although it is
discovered that all CSQBC protocols are flawed if there is no mechanism of
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punishment, this flaw is fixed by running CSQBC on quantum blockchain, as
it is shown in [21].
3 Voting on quantum blockchain
In the simplest setting of voting, n voters vote on an issue. Every voter Vi has
a private binary value vi ∈ {0, 1}, where vi = 0 means disagree and vi = 1
means agree. The following is our protocol for simple voting, of which the
structure is similar to (and simpler than) the voting protocol on the Bitcoin
blockchain [29,25]. It consists of two phases: the ballot commitment phase and
the tally phase.
1. Ballot Commitment.
(a) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, voter Vi generates the i-th row of an n × n
matrix of integers ri,1, . . . ri,n, whose sum
∑
j ri,j and 0 are congruent
modulo n+ 1. That is,
∑
j ri,j ≡ 0 (mod n+ 1).
(b) For each i and j, voter Vi sends ri,j to Vj via quantum secure commu-
nication [3,31].
(c) Now for each i, voter Vi knows the i-th column r1,i, . . . , rn,i. Then he
computes his masked ballot v̂i ≡ vi +
∑
j rj,i (mod n+ 1). Vi commits
v̂i to every miner of the blockchain by the CSQBC protocol of Sun and
Wang [20].
2. Tally by decommitment.
(a) For each i, Vi reveal v̂i to every miner of the blockchain by opening his
commitment.
(b) All the miners run the quantum honest-success Byzantine agreement
protocol [21] to achieve a consensus of on the masked ballot v̂1, . . . , v̂n.
(c) The result of voting is obtained by calculating
∑
i v̂i, which equals to∑
i vi because
∑
i v̂i ≡
∑
i(vi +
∑
j rj,i) ≡
∑
i vi +
∑
i,j rj,i ≡
∑
i(vi +∑
j ri,j) ≡
∑
i vi (mod n+ 1).
3.1 Security analysis
Our voting protocol satisfies the following security requirements:
1. Anonymity.
This is because quantum secure communication prohibits other voters to
gain any knowledge about a voter’s ballot.
2. Binding.
Other voters cannot change a voter’s ballot because of the authentication
procedure of the blockchain. The voter himself cannot change his submitted
ballot because of the binding property of quantum bid commitment.
3. Non-reusability.
This is because the blockchain technology solves the double spending prob-
lem: no voter can successfully uploaded two different ballots to the blockchain.
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4. Verifiability.
Every voter can check if his masked ballot is successfully upload to the
blockchain because the blockchain is a transparent database.
5. Eligibility.
This is ensured by the authentication procedure of the blockchain: only
authenticated voters can successfully communicate to the miners.
6. Fairness.
This is ensured by the concealing property of quantum bit commitment.
7. Self-tallying.
This is because the blockchain is a transparent database. All data on the
blockchain is accessible to every interested user.
4 Conclusion and future work
This paper proposes a simple voting protocol based on quantum blockchain.
Besides being simple, our voting protocol is anonymous, binding, non-reusable,
verifiable, eligible, fair and self-tallying. Our voting protocol is also realizable
by the current technology.
We have demonstrated that quantum blockchain can significantly simplify
the task of electronic voting. In the future, we are interested in applying quan-
tum blockchain to other fields such as auction and mechanism design. We
believe quantum blockchain will also simplify these tasks.
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